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THE IMPROVEMENT OF WATER AND WATER-DEPENDENT
RESOURCES UNDER THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER ANNEX
Sandra Zellmer, David Gecas and Kori Anne Mann]
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, the eight Great Lakes Governors and the Premiers of Ontario and
Quebec signed the Great Lakes Charter, a non-binding agreement for managing
Great Lakes water resources.2 The overarching objectives of the Charter are "to
protect and conserve the [water] levels and flows . .. [and] the environmental
balance of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" while also "provid[ing] a secure
foundation for future investment and development within the region" through
cooperative management.3
Principle IV of the Charter declared the signatories' intent with respect to
diversions of water from the Basin:
No Great Lakes State or Province will approve or permit any major new
or increased diversion or consumptive use of Great Lakes water without
the consent and concurrence of all affected Great Lakes States and
Provinces.4
For the most part, the Charter, along with the federal Water Resources
Development Act of 19865 and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909,6 have been
sufficient to serve the needs of this temperate region, where water shortages and
disputes over water management are relatively rare. In 1998, however, the Nova
Group of Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario proposed to export approximately 159 million
gallons of water annually from the Great Lakes to Asia. The Nova proposal was
ISandra Zellmer is an associate professor at the University of Toledo College of Law and faculty
member of the Legal Institute of the Great Lakes. David Gecas and Kori Anne Mann are J.D.
Candidates, University of Toledo College of Law. The authors thank Dean Phil Closius and the
College of Law for their generous research support.2 The Great Lakes Charter, Feb. 11, 1985 (visited Dec. 14, 2002) <http://www.cglg.org/pub/charter/
index.html>.3 d.
41d. at Principle 4.5Water Resources Development Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (amended 2000).
6See Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Art. III, Jan.
11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (generally requiring International Joint Commission approval of use,
diversion, or obstruction of boundary waters if levels or flows on the other side of the boundary are
affected).7International Joint Comm'n, Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes: Final Report to the
Governments of Canada and the United States § 10 13 (Feb. 22, 2000) (visited Nov. 8, 2002)
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highly controversial, and it prompted a re-examination of Great Lakes water
management policies.
Against this backdrop, the Governors *and Premiers signed a supplementary
agreement to the Charter on June 18, 2001.8 This agreement, known as the
Annex or Annex 2001, established principles for a new decision making
framework for reviewing proposed withdrawals of Great Lakes water. Annex
2001 is the first step toward a set of binding water management agreements to be
negotiated by June 2004. 9
Directive 3 of the Annex provides that proposals to withdraw water will not be
approved unless they will produce "an improvement to the waters and water
dependent natural resources of the Great Lakes Basin." 10 The Annex uses the
term "improvement" with reference to ecosystem integrity rather than economic
or other societal values." Related themes are found in a variety of international,
federal and state laws, but few if any provisions require ecosystem improvement
as an explicit end goal.
In a modest attempt to further define this standard, this paper will review
existing statutes and regulations in search of analogous legal requirements. Our
assessment is intended to provide some initial direction and guidance for the
interested public and for decision-makers faced with the task of implementing the
improvement standard. As the scope of our endeavor is limited to existing law,
we must leave it for ecologists and experts from other disciplines to establish
clear, quantifiable goals and measurements to ensure that the improvement
standard is articulated and met.
1 2
In order to limit our inquiry to laws that were most on point, and therefore
most likely to provide meaningful guidance, we rejected several possible legal
analogues when we began this assessment. First, sustainability and sustainable
development is a common theme of a variety of international environmental
agreements. 3 Federal forestry and public land management statutes also direct
<http://www.ijc.org/ijcweb-e.html>; Gary Ballesteros, Great Lakes Water Exports and Diversions:
Annex 2001 and the Looming Environmental Battle, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 10611 (2002).
8See Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes Water Management Governance (visited Nov.
8, 2002) <http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/>.
91d. Once completed, binding agreements would have to be approved by the appropriate State and
Provincial legislatures before they become legally binding. In addition, Congress must approve
binding compacts among the States. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Suzanne Zazycki, Compact =
Contract, LakeLinks (Newsletter of the Legal Institute of the Great Lakes) (Spring/Summer 2002).
'°Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter, Directive
#3, June 18, 2001 (visited Dec. 13, 2002) <http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/Annex2001.pdf>.
I 11d. at 3. See infra Section II.
12Further refinement of the improvement standard will require multi-disciplinary efforts, such as
that being undertaken by the Great Lakes Commission in developing a Water Resources
Management Decision Support System, which will include annual water use inventories and
ecological evaluations of the Great Lakes system. See Water Resources Management Decision
Support System (visited Jan. 31, 2003) <http://www.glc.org/wateruse>. See also Jeffrey E.
Edstrom, et al., An Approach for Identifying Improvements under the Great Lakes Charter Annex
2001, 4 J. Great Lakes' L. Sci. & Policy 335 (2002).
13See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/151/5/Rev. 1, 31
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that natural resources be utilized in a sustainable fashion.' 4 The concept turns on
providing sustained yields of various resource outputs, however, and while it
may promote conservation of resources, it does not require ecosystem
improvement.
Similarly, provisions of certain federal pollution control statutes are somewhat
analogous, but are not directly on point.' The Clean Air Act requires that new
sources obtain offsets, or reductions in air pollutants, before commencing
construction in areas that do not attain national ambient air quality standards.
16
The Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA or Superfund) requires restoration of natural resources, such as
fisheries, damaged by the release of hazardous substances. 17 Yet neither of these
regulatory programs includes ecosystem improvement as a requirement of permit
or project approval or clean-up efforts.
We ultimately selected provisions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and
the Clean Water Act (CWA) for detailed analysis, as they appeared to be the
most analogous to "improvement" as the term is utilized in Annex 2001.
Particular emphasis is given to the requirements associated with two permit
programs: (1) "Incidental Take Permits" (ITPs) issued by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine and Fisheries Service (NMFS)
under ESA § 10,18 and (2) CWA § 404 permits, issued by the Army Corps of
Engineers for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into navigable waters,
including wetlands.' 9
ESA § 10 requires a habitat conservation plan before an entity may obtain an
ITP for a project that might "take" a member of a protected species.2 °
Conservation plans 2typically include long-term ecosystem protection and
restoration measures.2 ' Such measures could be considered improvements over
baseline conditions at the time of project implementation.
CWA § 404 requires avoidance or mitigation of losses to wetlands caused by
22dredging or filling in the course of development and other activities. Wetlands
I.L.M. 874 (1992), and Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151.26 (1992) (calling for development
that maximizes human potential while protecting the environment); Convention on Biological
Diversity Art. 6(a), 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) (committing members
to "develop national strategies for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity").
14See National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 160 1(d), 1604(g) (1999); Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(c)(1), 1732(a) (1995).15See Resource Improvement Standard Briefing Paper to the Great Lakes Commission (visited Oct.
11, 2002) <http://www.glc.org/wateruse/pdf/BriefingPaper-October.pdf> (providing case studies
of various federal and state programs that utilize concepts similar to "improvement").
1642 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (1997).
1742 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1997).
'l6 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (1999).
1933 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001).
2016 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (1999).
21See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, Endangered Species
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook 1-15, 3-20 (1996).
2233 U.S.C. § 1344(a). See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (2002).
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restoration or "banking" may be required in order to obtain a § 404 permit.
Requirements for on-site restoration, in particular, may be comparable to an
improvement standard. Wetlands banking could also improve environmental
conditions by requiring a net gain of quantity and overall quality of wetlands, and
by creating and maintaining relatively large wetland parcels to replace smaller
wetland areas lost to development.
23
We begin in Section II by defining the word "improvement" as it is used in the
Annex. This is followed by a discussion of the overarching goals of the ESA and
its key provisions in Section III. We then draw analogies between the ITP
mitigation requirements and the improvement standard by assessing agency
interpretations and judicial challenges with respect to the ITP permitting process.
Section IV compares the improvement standard to CWA §404. Both the ESA
and CWA permitting programs contain language that is analogous to the
improvement standard, especially when viewed in light of the overarching,
proactive objectives of the two statutes. Implementation of ESA § 10 and CWA §
404, however, does not always yield results that promote overall program goals.
We therefore conclude in Section V with a discussion of the lessons learned from
these programs, and some preliminary observations regarding the implementation
of the improvement standard.
II. THE IMPROVEMENT STANDARD OF THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER ANNEX
The Annex defines "improvement" as:
Additional beneficial, restorative effects to the physical, chemical
and biological integrity of the Waters and Water-dependent
natural resources of the basin, resulting from associated
conservation measures which include, but are not limited to,...
mitigating adverse effects of existing water withdrawals, restoring
environmentally sensitive areas or implementing conservation
measures in areas or facilities that are not part of the specific
proposal undertaken by or on behalf of the withdrawer.
24
The phrase "additional beneficial, restorative effects" presumably means that
to qualify as an "improvement", the required conservation measures must
provide ecosystem benefits beyond a one to one compensation for the effects of
the proposed withdrawal. In other words, mitigation that simply preserves the
status quo or causes "no net loss" as a direct effect of the proposed withdrawal
will be insufficient. 25 There must be a net gain, measured from environmental
conditions immediately preceding the withdrawal. This presumption about the
23See Congressional Research Service, Wetlands Mitigation Banking: Status and Prospects (1997),
97-849 ENR (visited Nov. 8, 2002) <http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Wetlands/wet-8.cftn>.24Great Lakes Charter Annex, supra note 10, at 3.25
"No net loss" is a goal of the CWA § 404 wetlands program, discussed below, see infra Part IV
(analyzing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2001)).
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intended baseline from which to measure improvements seems justified because
the drafters included a separate "no net loss"
provision, also in Directive 3, stipulating that there be "no significant adverse
impacts to the quantity or quality of the waters and water-dependent natural
resources.. .,26 This provision is immediately followed by the improvement
requirement.
III. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA)
President Richard Nixon signed the ESA into law in 1973.28 The Supreme
Court has described the ESA as "the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation., 29 Prior federal
efforts to protect imperiled species had not been successful in preventing species
extinctions. 30 The ESA was Congress's decisive solution.3'
A. The Overarching Goals of the ESA
The plain intent of Congress in enacting the ESA "was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." 32 This desire is reflected not
only in the stated policies of the Act, but in nearly every section of the statute.33
The Supreme Court has found that "the omission [from the ESA] of the type of
qualifying language previously included in endangered species legislation reveals
a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the
'primary missions' of federal agencies. 3 4 In other words, the ESA elevates the
needs of listed species over nearly all other concerns. This ambitious
overarching objective suggests a parallel between the ESA and the improvement
standard, in that the maintenance of existing ecological conditions, without more,
falls short of satisfying the objectives of either. A closer examination of the
ESA, however, reveals that this analogy is not perfect, particularly when it comes
to the issuance of Incidental Take Permits (ITPs).
B. Key Provisions of the ESA
Three sections of the ESA, operating as part of a single permitting process,
appear at least somewhat analogous to the improvement standard. Section 9 of
26Great Lakes Charter Annex, supra note 10, at 2 Directive #3.2 7
Id.
28Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 1973 Pub. Papers
1027, 1027-28.29Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).3 0Daniel J. Rohlf, The Endangered Species Act: A Guide to its Protections and Implementation,
Stanford Environmental Law Society, 21-23 (Stanford 1989).
31Tony A. Sullins, Endangered Species Act: Basic Practice Series 2 (2001).32Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 699 (1995)
(citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184) (emphasis added).33Id.
34TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 185.
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the ESA prohibits the "taking" of listed species.35 Section 10 provides an
exception to this prohibition under which private individuals may obtain an ITP
as long as they meet certain requirements. Section 7 prohibits the government
from issuing ITPs, or engaging in any other federal action, if such action is likely
to jeopardize the continued survival of listed species in the wild.37 This part
examines each of these provisions separately.
At least one additional ESA provision is arguably comparable to an
improvement standard, but we ultimately determined that it did not warrant in-
depth treatment. Section 4 requires recovery plans for listed species, unless the
Secretary finds that such plans "will not promote the conservation of the
species. 38  Both the adoption and contents of recovery plans are highly
discretionary. 39 Although the ESA directs the agency to "consider the distinct
needs of separate ecosystems" occupied by the species, most courts view
recovery plans as guidance documents only, undermining the likelihood of actual
ecosystem improvement.4 °
1. The "Take" Prohibition of Section 9
Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the "take" of fish and wildlife species listed as
"endangered" under the ESA.41 Federal regulation extends this prohibition to
most species listed as threatened but not endangered. 42 "Take", as defined by the
ESA, means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct., 43 Among these terms, the
word "harm" has been given the broadest interpretation and is defined by the
FWS to include habitat modifications that "significantly [impair] essential
behavior patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering. 4
Regulated parties have argued that the Secretary should limit the purview of
"harm" to direct applications of force against protected species, and not to
3516 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(1)(B) (1999).
3616 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1999).
3716 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1999).
3816 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1999). A separate provision of § 4 requires the designation of critical
habitat for listed species, but its efficacy is limited by an exception from designation when
economic or other harms outweigh the benefits of designation. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)
(1999). The FWS believes that "critical habitat designation provides little or no conservation
benefit despite the great cost to put it in place." Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the
Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 62 Fed. Reg. 39129, 39131 (1997).
39See Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F.Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1997), aff'd, 187 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1998);
Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F.Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
4°See, e.g., Strahan, 967 F.Supp. at 598; Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 547 (1 1th
Cir. 1996). As of 2002, slightly more than half of all listed species had recovery plans, and only a
handful of species have been removed from the list because of recovery. See FWS, Threatened and
Endangered Species System(visited Jan. 30, 2003)
<http://ecos.fws.gov/servet/TESSWebpageDelisted?listings=O>.
4116 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(1)(B).
4250 C.F.R. § 17.3 1(a) (1998).
4316 U.S.C. § 1532 (19) (1999).
4450 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
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activities which adversely affect the species' habitat.45 The Supreme Court,
however, disagreed: "the dictionary definition [of harm] does not include the
word 'directly' or suggest in any way that only direct or willful action that leads
to injury constitutes 'harm.' ,46 It also found that "the broad purpose of the ESA
support[ed] the Secretary's decision to extend protection against activities that
cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid," specifically,
harms that reduce the likelihood of a listed species surviving in the wild.
Habitat modifications that cause injury to listed species are therefore prohibited
by § 9.
2. Section 10(a): HCPs and ITPs
In 1982 Congress amended the ESA and added section 10.48 One of the
purposes of the amendment was to alleviate the potentially draconian effect of §9
on habitat alteration and development. Section 10(a) gives the Secretary of the
Interior authority to issue "Incidental Take Permits" (ITPs).49 ITPs are an
exception to the § 9 takings prohibition. Once a landowner has determined that a
take of a listed species is likely to occur during her proposed activity, she may
apply for an ITP. To obtain a permit, the applicant must develop and submit a
Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP), which specifies: (1) the likely impact from the
taking; 2) the steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate the impacts
to the species; 3) alternative actions considered and the reasons for not choosing
them; and any other measures the Secretary may require as necessary or
appropriate.'
After submission of a completed application, and after opportunity for public
comment, an ITP will be issued if the Secretary finds that: (1) the taking will be
incidental (i.e., not the purpose of the proposed activity); 2) the applicant will, to
the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such
taking; 3) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be
provided; 4) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival
and recovery of the species in the wild; and (5) other required measures will be
met. 1
3. Section 7(a)(2): Consultation and the "God Squad"
ESA Section 7(a)(2) requires that federal agencies:
In consultation with and with the assistance of [NMFS or FWS],
assure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
45See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697
1995).
6Id.
"Id. at 698.
4816 U.S.C. § 1539 (1999).
4916 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1) (1999).
5016 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (1999).
51 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (1999).
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agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
52
any endangered species or threatened species...
Issuance of an ITP under §10 is subject to this consultation requirement
because it is considered an "action authorized" by a federal agency. The word
"action" includes "actions intended to conserve listed species ... [as well as] the
granting of licenses, contracts, [and] leases., 53 The term "Federal agency" means
"any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States., 54  This
definition encompasses both FWS and NMFS. To "jeopardize" a species is "to
engage in an action which reasonably would be expected... to reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of the species in the
wild...5
In the case of ITPs, the FWS is the federal agency, and authorization of the
permit is the agency action. Therefore, the FWS must consult with itself before
issuing an ITP to a developer to ensure compliance with the § 7 consultation
requirement. This involves a three step process: (1) the agency must determine
whether listed species reside in the affected area; 2) if there are listed species in
the affected area, the agency must prepare a biological assessment to determine
whether the species is likely to be affected by the development; and 3) if so, the
agency must prepare a Biological Opinion (BO) stating whether or not the
proposed action will jeopardize the listed species. If the proposed development
action is expected to jeopardize the listed species, the action may not proceed
absent an exemption granted by the Endangered Species Committee (ESC).5 6
The ESC is a panel composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture, the Army, and
the Interior, as well as the EPA Administrator, the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and one individual from each affected state. 57 This panel is
referred to as the "God Squad" because of its power to authorize actions likely to
jeopardize listed species, and perhaps even to result in extinction. Exemptions
from the §7 no-jeopardy requirement are very rare.58
Parts of sections 7 and 10 may appear duplicative. For example, § 10's
requirement that issuance of the ITP not "appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
survival and recovery of the species in the wild" is almost a restatement of the
definition of jeopardy: "to engage in an action which reasonably would be
expected... to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of the species in the wild. . .9 The agencies have stated that
5216 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2) (1999) (emphasis added).
5350 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1999).
5416 U.S.C. §1532(7) (1999).
5550 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2001).
5616 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
5716 U.S.C. §1536(e)(3) (1999).
58See Sullins, supra note 3 1, at 104.
5950 C.F.R. § 402.02. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service,
Endangered Species Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook, 3-20 (1996).
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compliance of an HCP with § 10 and §7 "should be regarded as a concurrent and
integrated process.. not independent and sequential. '0
C. The Improvement Standard as Analogous to the ITP Requirements
As noted above, § 10 requires applicants to submit an HCP that meets certain
criteria to receive an ITP. These criteria are similar to an improvement standard.
Although the improvement standard in the Annex explicitly contains the word
improvement and the HCP criteria do not, for the most part, the two are
analogous on paper. When it comes to implementation, however, the HCP
criteria fall short of an improvement, primarily because agency interpretations of
§ 10 encourage, but do not require, improvements, and because improvements
that are required in HCPs do not always materialize as planned.
1. The Impact of the ITP: Survival versus Recovery
Section 10 conditions the issuance of ITPs on, among other things, approval
of a HCP that will "minimize and mitigate" the impacts of the proposed action to
the "maximum extent practicable."'', This requirement is at least somewhat
analogous to the Annex's improvement standard, which conditions water
withdrawals from the Great Lakes on "an improvement to the waters and the
water dependent resources of the Great Lakes Basin."62 In comparison to the
improvement standard, the § 10 requirement is less clearly a mandate to produce
a net environmental gain. ITPs were designed by Congress to authorize
incidental take and allow development to go forward, not to be mandatory
recovery tools. 63 This does not mean, however, that recovery of listed species is
not a consideration in HCP design. To the contrary, recovery is an important
consideration because "a poorly designed HCP could readily trigger the
'appreciably reduce' or 'jeopardize' standards... thus contribution to recovery
is... an integral product of an HCP. 64 Along these lines, even though FWS and
NMFS may not mandate that HCPs contribute to the recovery of listed species,
their HCP Handbook does direct that applicants for ITPs be "encouraged to
develop HCPs that produce a net positive effect on a species. '65  This is
6Id. at 1-17. The relationship between sections 7 and 10 is explored in Environmental Protection
Information Center, Inc. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 67 F.Supp.2d 1113 (N.D. Cal. May 05, 1999),
vacated in part on other grounds, Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Pacific
Lumber Co., 257 F.3d 1071 (9t" Cir. 2001). See id. at 1121 (citing Notice of Availability of Final
Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning, 61 Fed.Reg. 63854, 63856 (1996), which explains
that "section 7 and its regulations introduce several considerations into the HCP process that are not
explicitly required by section 10-specifically, indirect effects, effects on federally listed plants,
and effects on critical habitats").
6116 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (1999).
62Great Lakes Charter Annex, supra note 10, at 3.63See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, Endangered Species
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook 3-20 (1996).64ld.
651d. at 1-15. See also Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35242 (June 1, 2000).
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consistent with the overarching objective of the ESA to "halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction.
66
Unfortunately, the goals of the ESA are not always met. The FWS has been
criticized for holding HCPs to a minimal "prevention of extinction" standard,
instead of an "enhancement" standard.67 Critics maintain that the FWS demands
"precious little" by way of mitigation measures when it approves ITPs, and that
what is "practicable" drives the choice of mitigation measures without re~ard for
whether the mitigation will fully offset the harm allowed by the ITP. Thus,
while FWS expressly encourages applicants to develop HCPs that will produce a
net positive effect on listed species, approved HCPs do not always produce such
an effect.
2. Mitigation
Section 10's requirement that an HCP mitigate adverse affects to the
''maximum extent practicable" indicates that an applicant must prevent and
minimize harm to a species and its habitat to a high degree, but need only take
those steps that are economically and technologically feasible. When asked, for
example, whether its mitigation policy could "call for a recommendation as
extreme as reflooding the Mississippi Valley," the FWS responded:
The mitigation policy would not lead to so extreme a
recommendation because it does not apply to development
actions completed prior to enactment of service authorities ... in
those cases where the policy does apply, there will be no
recommendations for mitigation over and above the level of
impacts associated with a project. This policy acts to minimize
impacts of projects not reverse them.69
In other words, rather than an improvement standard, it appears that FWS
66Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 699 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184).67Melinda E. Taylor, Promoting Recovery or Hedging a Bet Against Extinction: Austin Texas'
Risky Approach To Ensuring Endangered Species Survival in the Texas Hill Country, 24 Envtl. L.
581 (1994).
68David S. Wilcove et. al., Rebuilding the Ark: Toward a More Effective Endangered Species Act
for Private Land 11 (Environmental Defense Fund 1996) (visited Jan. 30, 2003)
<http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/483-Rebuilding%20the%2OArk%2Ehtm>.
Along the same lines, the FWS has been criticized for allowing the developer to proceed in the face
of uncertainty, and for including a "no surprises" or "safe harbor" provision in HCP's, thereby
providing developers with protection from more onerous provisions in the future. See 50 C.F.R. §
17.22(b)(5) (2000); Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35242 (June 1, 2000).
Professor Doremus explains that the "'no surprises" policy undermines the FWS's ability to change
or increase an HCP's protective measures in the event that "initial guesses ... prove too
optimistic." Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 Wash. L.J. 50, 71 (2001).
69U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Mitigation Policy, 46 Fed.Reg. 7644, 7647 (1981) (emphasis
added).
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interprets §10 as a "no net loss" requirement somewhat similar to CWA §404,
which is discussed below in Section IV.70
Permittees who wish to engage in activities that will result in habitat loss often
mitigate damages caused to listed species by "acquiring or otherwise protecting
replacement habitat...,,7 1 This is referred to as "habitat mitigation" and is
acceptable under the HCP process "so long as such mitigated habitat losses are
consistent with the § 10 issuance criteria.",72 Types of habitat mitigation include:
acquisition of existing habitat; protection of existing habitat through conservation
easements or other legal instruments; enhancement or restoration of disturbed
former habitats; prescriptive management of habitats to achieve specific
biological characteristics; and creation of new habitats.73 Different types of
habitat mitigation are appropriate in different cases. For example, where the
habitat type takes years to develop (e.g. old-growth forests), acquisition of
existing high quality habitat may be the best approach. However, the FWS
acknowledges that "if such habitat is continually being lost, this method alone
could result in a net loss of habitat value. 74
3. Alternatives and Other Measures
ESA § 10 prohibits the Secretary from issuing an ITP to any applicant whose
HCP fails to specify what "alternative actions" to the taking of listed species
were considered and the reasons why such alternatives were not utilized. 75
Section 10 also precludes the issuance of an ITP to any applicant whose HCP
fails to specify such "other measures" that the Secretary requires as being
necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan. 6
The FWS can rely on these two provisions to justify denials of ITPs, but they
are rarely at issue in the ITP process, and have received little attention. As it
happens, the majority of cases involving HCPs have been brought by third parties
to challenge the FWS's approval of an HCP and the subsequent issuance of an
ITP on the grounds that the HCP's mitigation measures are inadequate. 77 One
case that did arguably arise out of FWS's denial of an HCP was a regulatory
takings claim that was dismissed because the landowner had not accepted the
agency's offers to assist in the design of a satisfactory HCP.78 The court found
70See infra Section IV (discussing 33 U.S.C. § 1344).71U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, Endangered Species
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook, 3-20 (1996).72
1d.
73Id. at 3-22.741d.
7516 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(2)(A)(iii) (1999).
7616 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(2)(A)(iv) (1999).
77See, e.g., Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (M.D.
Fla. 2000); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2000); Sierra Club v.
Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (S.D. Ala. 1998); Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d
976 (9th Cir. 1985).78See Seiber v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002) (relying in large part on Boise Cascade Corp.
v. Board of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563 (Or. App. 1999), a case with similar facts but that involved a
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the agency action was not final, and the dispute was therefore not ripe.
79
D. Judicial Challenges to HCPs
There have not been many legal challenges to habitat conservation planning
in general or to individual HCPs.80 The few cases that have been brought
illustrate how the ITP mitigation requirements, while analogous to the
improvement standard on paper, may fall short of a net ecological gain when they
are implemented. Nonetheless, courts are highly deferential to FWS's
conclusions in the adoption of an HCP, and typically uphold HCP's so long as
the agency provides an adequate administrative record to support its decision.
In the first of these cases, the Ninth Circuit upheld an ITP authorizing the
"taking" of Mission Blue Butterflies in an area where the permittees wished to
construct residential housing. 81 The plaintiff, an environmental group, alleged
that FWS violated both §10 and §7 of the ESA in issuing the ITP. 8 According to
the plaintiff, FWS violated §10(a) by not meeting the required mitigation
requirements. FWS argued that the mitigation requirements were satisfied
because the HCP would actually enhance the survival of the Mission Blue
Butterfly.8 3 The FWS's argument was based in part on the HCP's commitment to
combat encroachment of the invasive juniper brush into the butterfly's grassland
habitat, a problem that a prior study predicted would cause extinction of the
species even in the absence of human development on the land.
84
The plaintiff also argued FWS failed to satisfy a provision of §7 that requires
agencies to "use the best scientific and commercial data available" during the
consultation process.8 5 FWS responded that the data, though concededly derived
from methods inherently resulting in a high level of uncertainty, represented the
best data available.86 The court applied the narrow "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review, under which FWS's issuance of the ITP would be upheld so
long as FWS had "considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made. 87 As a result, the court
upheld the agency's decision to issue the ITP.88
In a more recent case, an environmental group initiated a lawsuit against then-
Secretary Babbitt for allegedly violating the ESA by granting an ITP to the
landowner that had not submitted an HCP).791d.
80Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game Theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and a Framework for
Empirical Analysis. 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 33, 60-61 (2002).
81Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985).82Id. at 981, 983.83/d. at 982.
84/d. at 979.
8516 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2) (1994).
86Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 979.87Id. at 981 (citing Baltimore Gas and Electric Company v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983)).
88/d. at 981, 988.
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County of Volusia, Florida. 89 The county used the permit to build lights along a
beach that was a nesting ground for threatened sea turtles. When baby sea turtles
hatched many of them instinctively followed the artificial light instead of the
moonlight and never made it to sea.9 ° The county also allowed vehicular traffic
on the beach, which resulted in garbage and tire ruts, and "generally disturb[ed]
the natural condition of the beach and its sand." 9'
FWS argued in part:
The total extent of sea turtle nesting on all of Volusia County's
beaches accounts for 2.8 percent of all loggerhead, 3 percent of
all green, and less than 1 percent of all leatherback ...
Volusia's coastline is not considered essential nesting area for
any of the species at issue... [and ] the total number of turtle
nests found in the County are insignificant in relation to the
recovery and survival of the species.
The court agreed that granting the ITP was proper because the HCP contained
"minimizing" factors such as diminishing the total beach area over which
vehicles were allowed to travel, reducing times of day when vehicles were
allowed on the beach, and restricting commercial fishermen and
concessionaires. 93 The court also approved the HCP's attempt to "mitigate" the
adverse impacts on the turtles by incorporating a Beach Lighting Management
Plan.94 This involved modifying all county-controlled lights if necessary to bring
them into compliance with guidelines established by the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (FDEP); agreeing to come up with a plan to correct
lights not owned by the county; and increasing enforcement efforts for the95
Volusia County Lighting Ordinance. The court found that these factors
satisfied the "maximum extent practicable" mitigation standard of § 10.96 It
ultimately concluded that the ITP was not arbitrary and capricious due largely to
the "insignificant" number of affected turtles and the FWS's assertion that
"closing the beaches entirely during the spring and summer months was patently
impracticable" because of the serious economic and community impacts that any
reduction in beach usage would have in the County.97
These cases indicate that courts are highly deferential to agency determinations
89Loggerhead Turtle v. the County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 120 F. Supp. 2d. 1005
(M.D. Fla. 2000).
"Id. at 1008.
92Id. at 1015.
93Id. at 1020.94Id.
95Id. at 1015.
96Id. at 1020.971d.
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that an HCP has satisfied § 10 and §7. They also suggest that the "best scientific
data" upon which the agency bases a § 7 no-jeopardy opinion may yield results
with a high degree of uncertainty, and thus impede the agency's ability to
accurately predict the impact of a proposed HCP. Finally, the maximum extent
of mitigation that an agency considers "practicable" in light of economic
considerations may amount to a net reduction in habitat value as measured from
the ecological baseline, rather than improvement.
E. Political influences on the ITP Permitting Process
Social factors can have a pervasive influence on the ITP permitting process, in
addition to, or perhaps in spite of, the legal requirements addressed above. In
particular, political forces play a significant role in ESA implementation and can
diminish its efficacy, particularly in the ITP context.
Only 14 ITPs were issued between 1982 and 1992, but 193 were issued
between 1994 and 1997.98 Possible reasons for the dramatic increase in the
number of ITPs issued during the mid-1990s include proposals by the 10 4th
Congress to amend the ESA, a relatively conservative Supreme Court, judicial
decisions limiting Congress's Commerce Clause powers, and the risk to the
federal government jpresented by Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claims by
private landowners.' As for the last item, successful claims could require the
United States to pay just compensation to the landowner and establish adverse
precedent with nationwide ramifications.'
00
A leading example involves Charles Hurwitz, the chairman of the Houston
company Maxxam. Hurwitz sued the FWS in 1996, claiming that logging
restrictions stemming from the ESA amounted to a regulatory taking of property
owned by the Pacific Logging Company (a Maxxam company).'' The land in
question was occupied by at least two listed species, the marbled murrelet and the
coho salmon. The takings issue was never resolved and the case was ultimately
settled out of court, with the public paying $492 million to purchase 10,071 acres
of California Redwoods owned by Pacific Lumber, and the company agreeing to
an HCP covering all of the forest that it still owned (approximately 211,000
acres). 0 2 Under the terms of the plan and ITP, the company would be allowed to
98Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the ESA, 29
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10592, 10594 (1999).9 91d. Professor Pat Parenteau describes the increased use of HCP's in the mid-1990's, and the "no
surprises" policy incorporated in the HCP process, as a strategy "cooked up by people under stress
from the mindless Contract with America.. . something had to be done to stave off a full-scale
attack on the Endangered Species Act" by Representative Newt Gingrich and others in Congress.
See Jon Margolis, Critics Say 'No Surprises' Means No Protection, High Country News (Aug. 4,
1997) (visited Feb. 4, 2003) <http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?articleid=3481>.00U.S. Const. Amend. V.
'
01Paul Rogers, Deal Saves Ancient Trees; Papers Filed Two Minutes Before Midnight Deadline,
San Jose Mercury News (March 2, 1999). For environmental groups' challenges to the Hurwitz
ITP, see, e.g., Environmental Protection Information Center, 67 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1113 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
102Rogers, supra note 101.
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cut no more than 179 million board feet a year, 31 million less than what the
company had planned.1
0 3
Under different political circumstances, the government may have opted for a
trial rather than a settlement in the Hurwitz case. In other words, FWS could
have proceeded with a vigorous enforcement action under ESA § 9 to deter
Hurwitz from logging, and taken its chances with respect to Hurwitz's Fifth
Amendment claim. Instead, it responded to the private landowner's regulatory
takings claim with the approval of a 50-year HCP and the purchase of a
substantial tract of forest-land from Pacific Lumber. 0 4 Some scholars have
argued that FWS was unwilling to gamble in a lawsuit against Hurwitz because a
loss would set an adverse precedent and "significantly constrain the services'
future ability to regulate land use to protect listed species. '' 5
It is difficult to say whether the above HCP constitutes an unnecessary
compromise and over-concession on the part of the FWS or whether it amounts
to an improvement for murrelet and salmon habitat. The answer depends on
several unknown factors: (1) whether Hurwitz would have prevailed in his
regulatory takings claim had it gone to trial; (2) if not, whether he would have
logged the land in spite of the ESA restrictions; (3) whether unauthorized § 9
takings would have occurred during the logging; and (4) whether the FWS would
have prevailed in a subsequent enforcement claim against Hurwitz.
If Hurwitz would have prevailed in his defense of a government enforcement
action, it seems reasonable to describe the HCP and the land purchase as
improvements over the probable alternative: a precedent-setting Supreme Court
decision saying that environmental restrictions on private land amount to
regulatory takings requiring just compensation. Hurwitz and other private
landowners would then have much less to fear from the enforcement provisions
of the ESA, and an increase in the frequency of unauthorized §9 takings could
reasonably be expected to occur. The actual outcome in the Hurwitz case could
therefore be called an overall improvement over the probable alternative, but it
appears to be a net loss when viewed strictly from the perspective of listed
species, and thus does not constitute an ecological improvement as the term is
used in the Annex.
IV. SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The purpose of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") is to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 106 CWA §404 107 promotes water quality and overall hydrological integrity by prohibiting
the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters, including certain
10 3Id.
10 5Shi-Ling Hsu, supra note 80, at 60-61.
10633 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2001).
10733 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001).
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wetlands, unless authorized by a CWA permit.1
08
This section of the analysis provides an overview of the permit process under
CWA Section 404 and the mitigation requirements necessary to receive a permit.
The compensatory mitigation requirements, which often require enhancement or
creation of wetlands, are roughly analogous to the "improvement" standard in the
Great Lakes. Like the ITP requirements of the ESA, however, CWA § 404 falls
short of the mark in implementation.
A. Obtaining a Permit Under Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act
Section 404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting
through the chief of the Corps of Engineers, to issue permits after notice and
public hearings "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal sites." 109 Navigable waters are defined broadly, and
include certain marshy areas and other wetlands."10 Individual permits are
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and require completion of a multi-step
process."' Although the statute itself is silent on the specific permitting
requirements, regulatory guidelines have been developed by the Corps and the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). " 2
A three-step sequence of steps is required to obtain a permit: avoidance;
minimization; and compensatory mitigation. These steps are detailed in the
Corps-EPA Mitigation Memorandum of Agreement (Mitigation MOA)." 3 To
receive a permit, the first step a party must take is to demonstrate that there are
no practical alternatives to the destruction of wetlands, and the least
environmentally damaging alternative will be used." 4 The regulatory agencies
will presume there is a practical alternative if the project is not water
dependent."' Second, appropriate and practical steps must be taken to minimize
the adverse effects of the development on the wetlands." 6  Finally, if there is
damage to the wetlands that cannot be avoided or minimized, the permittee is
required to compensate for the damages." 7
1. The "No Practical Alternative" Requirement: Avoiding and Minimizing
'
81d. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(a)(2001) (prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters
without a permit).
10933 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001).
11033 C.F.R. § 329.3 (2003); see generally U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
123-25 (1985).
140 C.F.R. pt. 230.
"
2Id. at §230.10.
113Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department
of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section
404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210, 9212 (Mar. 12, 1990) (hereinafter Mitigation MOA).
'" 'See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a); Mitigation MOA, supra note 113, at 9212.
11540 C.F.R § 230.10(a)(3).
116Id. at §230.10(d).
1'17Mitigation MOA, supra note 113, at 9212.
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Damage
The discharge of dredge or fill material is prohibited if there is a practicable
alternative that would have less of an impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as
the alternative does not have other considerable adverse environmental
consequences. 1 8 An example of an alternative is if the project can be moved to
an area that does not affect wetlands, such as creating a golf course on higher
ground rather than developing the wetlands. 19  That alternative would be
considered practicable if it is available and capable of being done after taking
into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall
project purposes." 120 If the project in question is not water-dependent, it will be
assumed that an alternative is available "unless clearly demonstrated
otherwise.''
Finding a practical alternative is, without doubt, the best way to avoid adverse
impacts on wetlands. If no practicable alternative is found, however, wetlands
may be developed, but only if "appropriate and practicable steps have been taken
which will minimize potential adverse impacts of the discharge on the aquatic
ecosystem." 122 Before obtaining a permit one must avoid or minimize damage to
the water, plants and animals in the affected wetlands area. 1
23
11840 C.F.R. § 230.10(a).
119See Bersani v. U.S. E.P.A., 850 F.2d 36, 42-44 (2d Cir. 1988) (A developers request for a permit
to put a shopping mall on wetlands was denied because of the availability of more practical
alternatives) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989).
12040 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2).
12140 C.F.R. § 230. 10(a)(3). The developer must show that no other property could "reasonably" be
obtained to fulfill the "basic purpose of the proposed activity." Bersani, 850 F.2d at 44 (affirming
EPA's veto of a Section 404 permit on the grounds that the developer had failed to prove that there
was no alternative to its proposal to build a shopping mall in a wetlands area, when there were
other suitable properties available for purchase at the time the developer entered the real estate
market); National Wildlife Federation v. Whistler, 27 F.3d 1341 (8 th Cir. 1994) (upholding the
issuance of a permit for a "water dependent" project where the project's purpose was defined as
f2roviding boat access for a housing development).
240 C.F.R. § 230.10(d).
12340 C.F.R. § 230.75. The minimization of adverse effects on populations of plants and animals
can be achieved by:
(a) Avoiding changes in water current and circulation patterns which would interfere with
the movement of animals;
(b) Selecting sites or managing discharges to avoid creating habitat conducive to the
development of undesirable predators or species which have a competitive edge over
indigenous plants or animals;
(c) Avoiding sites having unique values, including threatened or endangered species
habitat,
(d) Using planning and construction practices to institute habitat development and
restoration to produce a new or modified environmental state of higher ecological
value;
(e) Timing discharge to avoid spawning or migration seasons and other biologically
critical time periods; and
(f) Avoiding the destruction of remnant natural sites within areas already affected by
development.
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2. The Compensatory Mitigation Requirement
The Mitigation MOA provides guidance for compensatory mitigation. It
expresses a preference for on-site mitigation as well as in-kind mitigation.' 14 The
Mitigation MOA favors restoration and enhancement, rather than creation or
preservation, as acceptable forms of compensatory mitigation.1 25 The Mitigation
MOA also approves mitigation banking as an option for compensatory
mitigation. 126
To obtain a permit, a party must submit compensatory mitigation plans that
promise future enhancement, restoration, or creation of wetlands.127  These
objectives should promote improvement of wetlands habitat. Implementation
experience, however, has not been encouraging. A recent report by the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences concludes that mitigation
plans are often unsuccessful largely because developers fail to follow through
with the plans to mitigate and regulators are often unable or unwilling to track
permits to make certain that developers are meeting their promises and to punish
those who do not.
128
A study conducted by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation
(FDER) provides detailed evidence of the deficiencies of compensatory plans.
129
The study was ordered by the Florida legislature in 1990 to assess the effect of
mitigation projects within the state. 30 The FDER evaluated sixty-three permits
that required wetland creation as mitigation for wetland impacts between 1985
and 1990.13 1 The FDER's study revealed a soaring rate of noncompliance. Of
the parties with permits that were required to mitigate, only four (6.3%) had
complied with their mitigation requirements.132 The study also found that thirty-
four percent of parties with permits failed to begin their creation projects before
124Mitigation MOA, supra note 113, at 9212.
125 Id
126Mitigation MOA, supra note 113, at 9212. See 1995 Federal Guidance for the Establishment,
Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605 (Nov. 28, 1995); J.B. Ruhl and R.
Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case Study of Wetlands
Mitigation Banking, 20 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 365, 372 (2001).
127Mitigation MOA, supra note 113, at 9212; Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 636 (6th Cir.
1997) (citing cases where courts have held that it is not necessary to have a final, detailed
mitigation plan in place prior to approval of a § 404 permit; instead, it is acceptable for the Corps to
approve a permit conditioned on future implementation of a mitigation plan).
See National Research Council, Committee on Mitigating Wetland Losses, Board on
Environmental Studies and Toxicology - Water Science and Technology Board, Compensating for
Wetland Losses under the Clean Water Act (2001) (hereinafter National Research Council); See
also U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, Wetlands: The Corps of Engineers' Administration of the Section 404
Program 55-73 (1988) (finding that Corps and EPA enforcement efforts are not effective).
129Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81
Iowa L. Rev. 527, 540 (1996) (citing Florida Dep't of Envtl. Reg., Report on the Effectiveness of
Permitted Mitigation Sites (Mar. 1991) [hereinafter FDER]).130Fla. Stat. Ann. §403.918(2)(b) (West 1994).
131Gardner, supra note 129, at 540.132 Id.
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impacting the wetlands.'33
The FDER recommended enhancement of degraded wetlands or restoration of
former wetlands when compensatory mitigation is to be used. 34 If enhancement
or restoration is not possible, preservation may be successful if used in
combination with other mitigation measures.1 35 Finally, wetland creation should
be used when it is the only remaining option.
36
The EPA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) also reported dismal
outcomes in their 1994 assessment of seventeen creation and restoration sites in
the state of Washington. 137 The EPA and FWS found that two of the seventeen
developers did not even begin the required compensatory mitigation, eleven sites
(65%) were not at the required level of ecological function, 138 and only four
mitigation sites (24%) were functioning well. 139
The EPA and FWS report concluded that the failure of the mitigation sites was
not necessarily due to the inadequate science of wetland restoration and
creation. 140 Instead, success depended largely on human and economic factors.
More specifically, human factors such as "commitment to plan, implement,
monitor, adjust, and maintain mitigation"'14 play a pivotal role in the success of
compensatory mitigation, as does having the financial resources and regulatory
incentive to access competent technical expertise. The regulatory bodies have
been criticized for allowing the "most simple and expedient" approach, which
usually turns on fixed ratios between wetlands lost and wetlands restored rather
than a sophisticated evaluation of wetland functions and values. 42 In addition,
the EPA and FWS acknowledged that some of the failures of the developers were
due to poor enforcement efforts.' 43
Failure of the Corps to enforce the 404 guidelines has had devastating impacts
on wetlands. The Corps often only requires a mitigation plan to obtain a permit,
and fails to monitor the site to see if the mitigation requirements are meet.
44
Without the Corps' watchful eye, developers fail to initiate or follow through
with the mitigation plans.' 45 Even if the sites were carefully monitored, in most
cases there is no pre-designated party responsible for correcting the failure to
133Id.
'
341d. at 541.
135Id.
136,d.
'
37Id. (citing U.S. E.P.A. and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Interagency Follow-Through
Investigation of Compensatory Wetland Mitigation Sites (May 1994)).
138Id.
139ld
'
1401d.
140Id.
'
42Ruhl, supra note 126, at 379.
43See Gardner, supra note 129, at 540; National Research Council, supra note 128.
'44Jonathan Silverstein, Taking Wetlands to the Bank: The Role of Wetland Mitigation Banking in a
Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands Protection, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 129, 133 (1994).
145ld. at 133.
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comply with the compensatory mitigation plan. 46 Developers have not been held
responsible for long-term monitoring or maintaining the mitigation sites to ensure
they are successful in the future. '
47
A more recent report by the Indiana Department of Environmental
Management (IDEM) confirms the deficiencies of compensatory mitigation in
the Great Lakes region. 48  The Indiana Wetland Compensatory Mitigation:
Inventory addressed compliance with mitigation projects primarily in the
northern part of Indiana, with clusters around Lake Michigan, Fort Wayne, and
Indianapolis.149  Thirty-seven percent of the 345 mitigation sites were in
watersheds that feed into Lake Michigan and Lake Erie.' 50 Of the 345 sites, 214
(62%) had been constructed, 70 (20%) were incomplete, 49 (14%) had failed to
initiate compensatory mitigation, and 12 (3%) did not have sufficient information
to be evaluated.15' Of the mitigation sites that were not constructed, many of the
parties responsible for mitigation had completely ignored the requirements, while
other parties began mitigation but failed to complete the required project. 52
The consensus is that compensatory mitigation is a proven failure when under-
taken by the developers after their permit has been issued. Studies spanning over
a decade of experience by state departments and federal agencies depict
discouraging statistics regarding failure rates, which ultimately translate into a
damaged ecosystem. The dismal track record should serve as a cautionary lesson
for the Great Lakes community as it moves forward with implementation of the
Annex.
B. Mitigation Banking
To counter the failures of on-site compensatory mitigation, mitigation banks
have been developed. Mitigation banking is a process where wetland sites are
held in reserve as the mitigation "bank".' Mitigation bankers can earn credits
for restoration, creation or enhancing the wetland "bank," and developers can
buy the credits from the mitigation bankers. 54
The use of a banking approach allows the applicant to purchase "improvement
credits" in advance, before the environmentally degrading activity is conducted.
Wetlands mitigation banks have been relatively successful in ensuring that there
146Id.
147 Id.
148Indiana Dep't of Envtl. Management, Section 401 Water Quality Certification Program, Wetland
Compensatory Mitigation Study, <http://www.state.in.us/idem/owm/planbr/wqs/mitigation
monitoring.htm> (visited October 22, 2002) (copy on file with author) (The study did not address
the success or function of these mitigation sites).
149Id. at 2.
150/d. at 10.
15'Id. at 2.
152/d. at 7.
153Jennifer Neal, Paving the Road to Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 161
(1999).
'
54Gardner, supra note 129, at 552-553.
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is "no net loss" of total wetland area. 155  The downside, however, is that
functional, unique wetlands are allowed to be destroyed as long as a developer
buys wetland credits from a mitigation bank, some of which are located in totally
different watersheds.156  Moreover, there is no assurance that the "banked"
wetlands are the functional equivalent or provide the same ecosystem values and
services as those that are lost to development. 1
57
The mitigation banking experience demonstrates that there is greater potential
for success if governmental agencies are involved in certifying the banks as true
"improvements," using ecologically sound, quantifiable criteria, in advance of
development, instead of leaving the burden on the permittees to effectuate
mitigation requirements after the fact. A vital element of an effective banking
system is that parties cannot count on "credits" that have not yet been earned,
which means that the improvement, enhancement or restoration must be
completed before wetlands are destroyed or water is allowed to be withdrawn. 5 8
Selling "improvement credits" in the form of established banks can greatly
increase the ecological success of the program because measurable improvement
must have already occurred before the permit may issue. If mitigation banking
were adopted as a means of securing an improvement to waters and water-
dependent resources in the Great Lakes basin, these issues must be addressed to
ensure successful implementation of the Annex 2001 standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Annex 2001 states that proposals to withdraw water from the Great Lakes must
not only prevent or minimize water loss, avoid adverse effects on water quantity
or quality and comply with state and federal laws, but they must also improve the
waters and natural resources of the Basin. Thus, like ESA §10 and CWA § 404,
Annex 2001 requires minimization of adverse ecological effects, but it goes
beyond existing regulatory programs to require resource improvement. This is an
innovative and proactive standard, in keeping with the status of the Great Lakes
155"No net loss" has been a long-standing goal of the wetlands program. See National Wetlands
Mitigation Action Plan (Dec. 27, 2002) (visited April 1, 2003).
<http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidance/map1226withsign.pdf>. It is intended to ensure that
there is no net loss in quantity of total wetlands area. See Mitigation MOA, supra note 113.t 56Lawrence R. Liebesmana and David M. Plott, The Emergence of Private Wetlands Mitigation
Banking, 13 NR & E 341, 343 (1998); Michael C. Blumm, The Clinton Wetlands Plan: No Net
Gain in Wetlands Protection, J. Land Use & Env. L. 203, 227-28 (1994). Although the agencies
have adopted a policy that banks should be in the same geographic area as the wetlands lost to
development, the use of a bank in adjacent areas may be allowed "when practicable and
environmentally desirable." Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of
Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58,611 (1995). The National Research Council
recommends that "site selection for wetland conservation and mitigation should be conducted on a
watershed scale in order to maintain wetland diversity and to enhance the long-run viability of
wetland and riparian systems." National Research Council, supra note 128.
157See Ruhl, supra note 126, at 379, 387-89 (noting that the assessment of wetlands function has
not improved significantly over the past decade). The banking program may result in an excess of
certain types of wetlands because they are easier and cheaper to create than others.158See National Research Council, supra note 128.
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aquatic ecosystem as the world's largest freshwater source.
The CWA and ESA are two of our nation's premiere environmental laws, and
they have done a great deal to protect water quality and imperiled species. Yet
they come short of requiring actual, long-term ecosystem improvement. The
CWA § 404 program fails to adequately monitor and enforce the developer's
promises to mitigate wetland losses. Meanwhile, the ESA requires that HCPs
include only those mitigation measures that are "practicable" in light of
economic considerations, often resulting in a net reduction in habitat values.
Moreover, the FWS has only limited ability to predict the impact of a proposed
HCP over time and to adjust HCP requirements to reflect changes in
environmental conditions or the needs of species.
Years of experience in implementing the CWA and ESA permitting programs
provide the following insights regarding Annex 2001. First, actual, measurable
improvement should be required before the removal of water occurs. Monitoring
will still be necessary to ensure that the effects of the project are as anticipated,
and that the improvement "banks" or other measures continue to function. The
inability to enforce measures adopted as improvements, or to follow through with
comprehensive monitoring requirements, could have devastating impacts on the
Great Lakes. In addition, specific technical and legal requirements must be
established to refine the improvement standard and guide the decisionmakers
who must implement it. The standard should be based on ecosystem values and
services rather than mere quantity or net replacement ratios. Last but not least,
Great Lakes authorities must provide sufficient incentives and funds to ensure
that technical expertise is developed and made available to regulators and the
regulated community. The improvement standard of Annex 2001 will, no doubt,
prove to be a challenging standard for all concerned, but one that is well worth
meeting.
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